




Research Question/Issue: We will examine the effects of firm- and country-level ‘good 
corporate governance prescriptions’ on firm performance 
before and during the recent financial crisis, using a large 
sample of 1197 firms across 26 European countries. 
Research Findings/Insights: Hierarchical linear modeling shows that 25 percent of the 
heterogeneity in firm performance is among countries, 
indicating the importance of including country-level 
institutions in our analyses. In the context of the crisis we find 
that the general quality of the legal system and creditor rights 
protection are positively related to firm performance but 
protection for equity investors is not. Contrary to good 
governance prescriptions, we find that board characteristics 
associated with vigilant monitoring perform worse in a 
financial crisis. In a crisis, CEO duality is associated with 
better performance and the number of board subcommittees has 
a negative impact. Board size, board and committee 
independence have no significant effect. We also find that the 
use of executive incentive compensation and the existence of a 
wedge between ownership and control rights negatively 
impacts on firm performance in a crisis. Our results are robust 
with regard to other statistical analyses (ordinary least squares). 
Other robustness checks suggest that the results may not be 
fully generalizable for firms in the financial sector.  
Theoretical/Academic 
Implications: 
The findings challenge the universality of good governance 
prescriptions and contribute to the growing body of work 
proposing that the efficacy of governance mechanisms may be 
contingent on organizational and environmental circumstances. 
Practitioner/Policy 
Implications: 
The study offers nuanced insights into policy and practitioner 
communities, showing that governance mechanisms operate 
differently in crisis and non-crisis periods. The tendency of the 
policy community to respond to a crisis with more stringent 
rules may be counterproductive since such measures may 
compromise executives’ ability to respond appropriately to 
systemic shocks. 
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How does ‘good’ corporate governance influence firm performance in a severe financial crisis? 
Received wisdom, based predominantly upon agency theory reasoning, suggests that firm- and 
country- specific good governance prescriptions, including an independent and vigilant board, 
the separation of key leadership roles, incentive alignment between owners and managers, and 
legal protection for creditors and minority shareholders, will enhance corporate value in the 
normal course of events. But do these prescriptions apply universally in all situations and for all 
types of firms (Judge, 2012)? Recent research suggests that the efficacy of governance 
prescriptions may be contingent on a variety of factors, such as national economic development 
(Chen, Li & Shapiro, 2011), national institutions (Carney et al., 2011; Henrekson & Jakobsson, 
2012; Renders & Gaeremynck, 2012), industry context (Chancharat, Krishnamurti & Tian, 
2012), ownership structure (Bruton et al., 2010; Desender et al., 2012), and a firm’s financial 
condition and stage in its life-cycle (Dowell, Shackell & Stuart, 2011). In this paper we 
contribute to contingency approaches in comparative corporate governance (Desender et al., 
2012) by investigating which firm- and country-specific governance mechanisms can help firms 
maintain their financial performance in a financial crisis relative to their performance in more 
routine, steady-state financial conditions. 
The 2007-2008 Transatlantic credit crisis has been the world’s deepest since the Great 
Depression of the last century. The origins of the present crisis were initially attributed to 
governance failures in the financial sector. The collapse of the U.S. real-estate market and the 
subsequent failure to offload subprime risk ultimately resulted in a credit crisis (Gregoriou, 
2009). Others implicate the use of novel and poorly understood financial instruments such as 
collateralized debt obligations. The use of high-powered incentive compensation for senior 




inadequacies in the wider corporate sector were a more probable cause of the crisis. In this view, 
boards of directors were believed to be inadequate in monitoring executives and evaluating the 
risks they assumed (Muller-Kahle & Lewellyn, 2011). Others pinpoint institutional failings 
governing risk management, credit rating, and financial reporting standards that proved 
ineffective in signaling underlying structural problems (Conyon, Judge & Useem, 2011). While 
the determination of the probable multiple causes of the current crisis awaits a comprehensive 
analysis, we aim to shed some light on the problem by examining the efficacy of good 
governance prescriptions that are believed to have universal relevance. In particular, our 
objective is to evaluate the robustness of several firm- and country-specific governance 
mechanisms and the extent to which they have withstood the crisis, as reflected in the financial 
performance of publicly listed firms. To do so, we will examine the effects of firm- and country-
level government mechanisms on firm performance before and during the recent financial crisis 
using a unique large sample of 1197 firms drawn from 26 European countries. The sample 
represents a strong test of the hypothesis since it consists of large and mature public 
corporations, for which good governance prescriptions are primarily intended.  
The basic logic informing this study suggests that corporate governance mechanisms 
which are beneficial (or at least not harmful) in steady-state financial conditions may have more 
pernicious effects in the context of a financial crisis. In particular, we reason that the checks and 
balances on executive actions performed by corporate boards, which are beneficial in the steady-
state, may prove overly restrictive on executive discretion in circumstances where decisive 
leadership and the ability to move quickly are valuable (Burkurt, Gromb & Panunzi, 1997; 
Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994). Furthermore, we reason that particular forms of executive 




and have different effects in steady-state and crisis conditions. This is because both costs and 
benefits are associated with different governance mechanisms and governance choices that are 
optimized for steady-state conditions may be misaligned in a crisis (Dowell, et al., 2011). In 
crisis situations, the costs associated with any particular governance mechanism may exceed its 
benefits, which may affect performance in a significant way.  
 Our contribution to the existing literature is threefold. Firstly, to our knowledge, this is 
the first study that focuses on the impact of firm-level and country-level governance mechanisms 
on European firms’ performance during the recent financial crisis. We can observe that the 
quality of the institutional environment in European countries is generally well-developed; but 
nevertheless, there is significant variation in national financial system architectures needed to 
test for the impact of cross-country differences (Renders, Gaeremynck & Sercu, 2010; Van 
Essen, van Oosterhout & Heugens, 2012c). Secondly, we use hierarchical linear modeling to 
simultaneously model firm- and institutional-level variables, allowing us to determine how much 
different levels of analysis explain firm performance differences in steady-state and crisis 
conditions (Judge, 2011). Thirdly, our study contributes to the growing body of literature that 
points to the contingent quality of good governance prescriptions and their inherent trade-offs 
with respect to desirable corporate outcomes (Aguilera et al., 2008). Our study points specifically 
to the need for governance mechanisms to be evaluated with regard both to their ability to 
function efficiently in steady-state conditions as well to their robustness to financial shocks. We 
will proceed in the following manner. We develop four theory-based hypotheses about the 
influence of firm-level and country-level governance characteristics on firm performance during 
both normal economic situations and financial crises. Section 3 describes the sample, variables, 




results. We conclude by pointing to the caveats regarding the limitations of research and discuss 
the policy and managerial implications of our findings, indicating avenues for future research 
into the efficacy of good governance prescriptions.  
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
A corporate governance system can be seen as a particular configuration of internal and 
external mechanisms that condition the generation and the distribution of residual earnings in a 
country's corporations (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Walsh & Seward, 1990). These mechanisms 
function at both the firm- and country-level of analysis (Judge, Gaur & Muller-Kahle, 2010). In 
this section, we develop a series of four hypotheses pertaining to ownership concentration and 
identity, board structure and composition, incentive compensation, and the quality of a country’s 
governance institutions. We also consider how specific governance mechanisms are intended to 
work under steady-state conditions and hypothesize how their functioning might shift during a 
financial crisis and the likely influence on firm financial performance.  
 
Ownership Concentration and Identity  
Ownership concentration can be a beneficial corporate governance mechanism, since 
large shareholders have a greater incentive to monitor senior managers compared with more 
diversified minority shareholders (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). Moreover, some large owners are in 
a position to intervene in the firm's affairs if necessary by, for example, correcting value-
destroying managerial actions. The motivation for monitoring and intervention stems from the 
fact that some large shareholders lock up a sizeable proportion of their wealth in a single 




since it creates the potential for large shareholders to seek the private benefits of control (Dyck & 
Zingales, 2004; Liu & Magnam, 2011; Van Essen et al., 2012c). The risk of realizing such costs 
is likely to be increased when the good governance prescription of one share-one vote is 
breached, for instance when large owners’ voting rights exceed their cash flow rights through the 
use of instruments such as pyramid structures or dual class shares (Faccio & Lang, 2002). Liu 
and Magnan (2011) find that the wedge between voting and cash flow rights leads to lower firm 
value in normal times. We agree that concentrated owners may engage in shareholder 
expropriation at any point but we can reason that the probability of expropriation is likely to be 
increased during a financial crisis as it is more difficult then to realize the expected rate of return 
and large shareholder or insider expropriation becomes more common (Bertrand, Mehta & 
Mullainathan, 2002; Joh, 2003). During crises, large shareholders may seek to minimize their 
own losses during a profit shock by tunneling resources out of the firm to externalize losses onto 
minority shareholders and to escape their own creditors. For example, several studies find that 
the Asian financial crisis has intensified the incentives for controlling shareholders to expropriate 
minority investors (Friedman, Johnson & Mitton, 2003). We can thus formulate the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1a: The presence of a wedge between cash flow and voting rights has a 
negative impact on firm performance during a financial crisis.  
 
However, we would hasten to add that concentrated owners do not make up a 
homogenous class, and there is growing research that suggests some owners may forego the 
temptation to expropriate and instead elect to ‘prop up’ and otherwise assist firms in which they 




2003). Although the development of a full-fledged theory of ownership types is beyond the 
scope of this article, we seek to account for the possibility that different types of large owners in 
European firms have a differential impact on firm performance during a financial crisis. We can 
distinguish between institutional, relational, and governmental largest shareholders (Van Essen et 
al., 2012c). The institutional investor is the quintessential transactional blockholder. In the 
normal course of events, institutional shareholders will seek to maximize returns from their 
equity stake and, while they will closely monitor the returns, they will typically avoid active 
involvement in firms whose shares they hold (Kochhar & David, 1996). On the other hand, in the 
context of a crisis, institutional investors are known for pulling out of a stock very quickly if they 
are unhappy with the returns. Transactional investors are likely to seek liquidity and reallocate 
capital to greener pastures in a crisis (Park & Song, 2001). Institutional investors have therefore 
little incentive or capability to prop up or bail out an underperforming firm. 
Relational shareholders, such as family owners, are typically tied strongly to their firm 
and consequently have longer investment horizons (Van Essen et al., 2012a). While there may be 
little difference in the performance of family versus other types of firms in the steady-state 
(Miller et al., 2007), family shareholders’ long investment horizons and their willingness to prop 
up firms in adversity (Villalonga & Amit, 2010) are likely to help in weathering a crisis. 
Propping a firm up during adversity can increase its resilience and improve its performance. 
Moreover, family firms are less inclined to use debt financing and consequently have less 
levered capital structures (Mishra & McConaughy, 1999), which makes them less vulnerable to 
credit crises. Sraer & Thesmar (2007) find that family firms smooth out employment in response 
to industry shocks in sales, which they suggest supports the view that family firms’ longer-




groups suggest that parent corporations may be more inclined to bailout affiliated firms through 
cross-subsidization mechanisms in difficult economic conditions (Claessens, Fan & Lang, 2006; 
Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 2002). 
 Government-owned firms are driven by regulatory or policy considerations rather than 
economic objectives, which makes them a different kind of shareholder altogether (Van Essen et 
al., 2012c). Most studies show that government ownership is associated with inefficiency and 
financial underperformance compared with private firms (Boardman & Vining, 1989). In the 
context of the crisis we expect stakeholders of state-owned firms, such as employees and 
suppliers, to engage in protracted negotiations to protect their interests. Government sensitivity 
to these concerns may make it difficult for them to make the adjustments necessary to maintain 
their firm's profitability. Accordingly, we expect state-ownership to be harmful to firm 
performance in a crisis. We can thus formulate the following hypotheses regarding ownership 
identity: 
Hypothesis 1b: Institutional ownership has a negative impact on firm performance 
during a financial crisis.  
Hypothesis 1c: Government ownership has a negative impact on firm performance 
during a financial crisis. 
Hypothesis 1d: Family ownership has a positive impact on firm performance during a 
financial crisis.  
Hypothesis 1e: Parent corporation ownership has a positive impact on firm performance 
during a financial crisis. 
 
 




While the board of directors can add value to a firm by providing good counsel and 
helping executives to identify and access scarce resources, there is general agreement that the 
primary role of a board of directors is to serve as a vigilant monitor of management. In the 
steady-state, board vigilance serves to mitigate the agency costs resulting from the separation of 
ownership and control (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Characteristic good governance prescriptions 
regarding vigilance include constraints on CEO authority created by separating the CEO and 
Board Chair roles. Board vigilance can be compromised when both roles are combined in the 
same person, an occurrence known as ‘CEO duality’ (Coles, McWilliams & Sen, 2001; Fama, 
1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983). An individual occupying both roles is very powerful and can 
readily manipulate the board’s agenda and control the flow of information to the board. Other 
characteristics of a vigilant board include the independence of directors (Van Essen, Van 
Oosterhout & Carney, 2012b), small board size (Yermack, 1996), frequent board meetings 
(Grove et al., 2011), and an active array of specialized committees. For example, Bruno & 
Claessens (2010) find that the presence and independence of four functional committees (audit, 
nomination, compensation, governance) has a positive impact on firm value.  
Notwithstanding the value of vigilant board oversight, alternative perspectives suggest 
that overzealous monitoring and frequent interference in a firm's affairs may discourage 
managerial initiatives (Burkurt, Gromb & Panunzi, 1997). In a large body of work, Finkelstein 
and his colleagues (Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990) find that 
powerful CEOs, for example those with CEO duality, tend to have a beneficial effect on firm 
performance in uncertain environments where, unencumbered by fewer constraints, they can 
make quick decisions without the need to build consensus. CEO duality allows a single unified 




Independent directors are typically busy people with their own responsibilities and have little 
incentive or ability to inform themselves with intimate details of the firms day-to-day operations. 
Williamson (2007) contends that external representatives on boards of directors have an 
information disadvantage compared with insiders and are typically slow to react in situations of 
adversity. Williamson warns that boards comprising a high ratio of external representatives 
typically “failed to act promptly and with urgency when a crisis occurs” (p.262). Accordingly, 
we reason that while board characteristics associated with vigilant oversight may represent best 
practice in stable-state conditions, such characteristics can inhibit managerial adjustment to the 
unforeseeable contingencies of a financial crisis with deleterious effects for a firm’s financial 
performance. In the context of the crisis, we expect there to be a performance disadvantage in 
firms that overly constrain CEO discretion through board governance mechanisms. We can thus 
formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Vigilant boards (those characterized by the separation of CEO and chair 
roles, a high fraction of independent directors, smaller boards, frequent meetings, and 
the presence and independence of functional committees) will have a negative impact on 
a firm’s financial performance during a financial crisis. 
 
High-Powered Incentive Compensation  
A foundational good governance prescription based upon agency theory can be used 
successfully to align senior management and shareholder interests through the use of high-
powered incentive contracts in the form of stock options (Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Tosi & 
Gomez-Mejia, 1994) or forms of variable pay, such as annual bonuses (Baker, Jensen, & 




plans may work to align management and shareholder interests in the normal course of events, 
the accumulated research tends to conclude that stock-based compensation also induces 
managers to take excessive risks (Agarwal & Mandelker, 1987) and encourages short-term 
profit-maximizing (Peng & Roell, 2008), which can undermine long-term firm value. 
Importantly, equity-based compensation encourage executives to increase the leverage of a 
firm’s capital structure (Mehran, 1992), which can boost returns to equity in favorable economic 
conditions. However, highly leveraged firms are more vulnerable during a financial crisis, 
because high interest rates increase debt costs and reduce profitability. Therefore, high-powered 
compensation incentives that typically boost firm performance in regular times, may work the 
other way around during crisis times. Grove et al. (2011) find that incentive pay has a positive 
impact on firm value during a pre-crisis period but no impact during times of crisis. Fahlenbrach 
& Stulz (2011) find some evidence that banks with CEOs whose incentives were better aligned 
with the interests of shareholders performed worse during the crisis. Accordingly, we can reason 
that the use of high-powered incentive compensation contracts will encourage executives to 
accentuate financial choices which have deleterious consequences for firm performance in crisis 
conditions. We can therefore formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: The employment of high-powered incentive compensation contracts for 
senior executives will be associated with lower firm performance during a financial 
crisis. 
 
Country-Level Governance Institutions 
The emergence of the law and finance literature underscores the importance of country-




et al., 2008). The core premise of this literature suggests that countries with good governance 
institutions, such as the rule of law and specific legal protection for investors and creditors, will 
develop large and liquid financial systems (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998). Specific legal protection 
for financial stakeholders can increase investor confidence in their ability to realize a return on 
their investment (Engelen & van Essen, 2010). The rule of law is an indicator of judicial integrity 
and respect for property rights. More specific legal protections exist to enhance a firm's ability to 
raise external finance either through either debt or equity. The logic of specific legal protection 
for shareholders ensures that corporate insiders respect their obligations towards smaller outside 
investors (Djankov et al., 2008b). Minority investors enjoy better protection when directors are 
legally empowered to act in their interests (Spamann, 2010). Creditor protection laws ensure that 
creditors are protected from default (Claessens, Djankov, & Klapper, 2003), which becomes 
more probable in the financial crisis. Stronger creditor rights lead to the increased availability of 
credit (Djankov, McLiesh & Shleifer, 2007; Djankov et al., 2008a), which might be more 
valuable during times of crisis as it keeps the credit line open. Moreover, superior judicial 
efficiency can improve the efficacy of loan recovery (Laeven & Majnoni, 2005). All things being 
equal, stronger legal protection for creditors is likely to enhance firm performance in a credit 
crisis, since provisions are likely to allay creditors’ fears of default.  
A financial crisis may create strong incentives for executives and controlling 
shareholders to engage in value destructive behaviors (Bertrand, Mehta & Mullainathan, 2002), 
through opportunistic expropriation or other forms of malfeasance, such as default on their credit 
commitments. Even if a country experiences a modest loss in investor confidence in the event of 
any financial shock, Johnson et al. (2000) show that firms, in countries with weakly enforceable 




expropriation and as a consequence, can exhibit worsened firm performance. While the impact of 
governance on firm performance might matter less in normal economic situations, when 
circumstances change drastically (e.g. a financial crisis), better governance becomes crucial to 
the preservation of firm value (Mitton, 2002). Stronger country level governance institutions 
should thus mitigate expropriation and tunneling and sustain firm performance in crisis 
conditions (Friedman, Johnson & Mitton, 2003). We can therefore formulate the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4a: Companies located in countries with a more developed legal framework 
have better firm performance during a financial crisis. 
 
Much law and finance literature emphasizes the beneficial effects of building equity 
market institutions that enable arms-length investment in liquid capital markets. However, many 
continental jurisdictions have developed a bank-based variant of these institutions (Hall & 
Soskice, 2001). Bank-based financial architectures place less emphasis on arms-length 
contracting and provide greater scope for more explicit coordination between firms and creditors. 
How different country level differences in financial architectures cope with financial crises and 
contribute to firm level performances is not well understood. On the one hand, with their more 
diversified portfolios, market-based investors typically possess a stronger risk bearing capacity 
(Levine, 1991). Bank-based financial systems, on the other hand, are shielded from the need to 
publicly disclose information about creditors, but they nevertheless allow more effective post 
lending monitoring, and are more powerful in enforcing debt repayment (Rajan & Zingales, 




Consistent with the law and finance literature, we expect that, as a baseline condition, 
market based governance systems will better support firm performance in steady-state market 
conditions, while we expect the reverse is likely to hold in a financial crisis. In a market-based 
system, regulators are likely to respond to a crisis by ‘shoring up the system’ (La Porta, Lopez-
De-Silanes & Schleifer, 2008) by, for example, refining and strengthening legal protection for 
investors. However, the effect of improved investor protection is unlikely to have much short-
term impact on a firm’s profitability. In contrast, in periods of market disorder, regulators in 
bank-based systems are more likely to intervene, using state mandates to seek immediate 
remedies. Moreover, due to the provisions for greater bank-firm coordination in bank-based 
systems (Hall & Soskice, 2001), bankers are better placed to take a leadership role in assisting 
troubled firms. Banks often have better information than arms-length investors, and can be more 
proactive in providing additional capital and participating in restructuring. We can therefore 
formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypotheses 4b: Firms based in bank-based financial systems are likely to perform better 
during a financial crisis than firms in a market-based financial system.  
 
DATA AND METHODS 
Data Collection  
Our sample consists of firms from 26 European countries. We collected most of the 
dataset manually between 2004 and mid-2009. In addition, digital information sources such as 
Datastream, Worldscope, and BoardEx were used to obtain firm-specific control variables and 
board characteristics. Country-specific data such as the overall quality of legal background 




system, were obtained from Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2009), Djankov et al. (2007, 
2008b), Doing Business (World Bank), La Porta et al. (1998), Spamann (2010) and Demirguc-
Kunt and Levine (2001). Our sample focuses on all major companies for each country by 
including all constituent firms of each country’s major stock indexi, yielding a total sample of 
1197 firms. Table 4 gives an overview of the number of firms per country.  
 
Definition of the Dependent Variable 
Our firm performance measure is the cumulative adjusted stock return (buy and hold 
return) during the financial crisis. Following Beltratti and Stulz (2009) and Fahlenbrach and 
Stulz (2010), we can measure a crisis period from July 2007 to January 2009. However, as a 
robustness check we can extend this period until March 2009, because most stock market 
indexes reached their minimum level during the first quarter of 2009. To isolate the firm-specific 
part of the cumulative stock return we adjust it for industry movements. Accordingly, our 
regression analyses use cumulative industry-adjusted returns rather than raw cumulative returns. 
 
Definition of the Independent Variables 
All our firm- and country-level independent variables lag the dependent variable, and are 
measured before the financial crisis to avoid possible confounding effects that are associated 
with the crisis (Durnev & Kim, 2005; Peng & Jiang, 2010). We first discuss the firm-level 
variables, followed by country-level institutional variables. We include three categories of firm-
level corporate governance variables pertaining to 1) ownership concentration and owner 
identity, 2) board structure and composition, and 3) incentive compensation. We also include 
several control variables pertaining to CEO and firm characteristics. Country level independent 





Ownership Concentration and Identity. The first set of variables captures the impact of 
ownership structure on firm performance. We constructed five dummy variables to distinguish 
the influence of concentrated and dispersed ownership on the one hand, and that of identities of 
concentrated owner on the other hand, on firm performance. Concentrated ownership is defined 
as a firm having a shareholder with 10% or more of the voting rights (Maury, 2006). 
Concentrated owners who reach this threshold are divided in the following four identity 
categories: corporation, family, government, and institutional owner (Faccio & Lang, 2002). To 
test our hypothesis of the impact of differences between voting and cash flow rights among 
European firms, we also collect the variable Ownership Wedge (Faccio & Lang, 2002). This 
dummy variable takes the value of one when there is difference between voting rights and cash 
flow rights of the largest shareholder and zero otherwise.  
 
Board Structure and Composition. Our second set of variables includes governance 
characteristics related to the structure of authority and the composition of the board of directors. 
The primary determinant of the vigilant board is the extent to which the roles of chairman of the 
board and CEO are separated. Conversely, following Finkelsteain and Hambrick (1994) we 
suggest that the concentration of both roles in same person, CEO duality, is indicative of greater 
executive discretion. CEO duality is operationalized as a dummy variable which is otherwise set 
to one if the chair of the board is taken up by the CEO and zero. Additionally, we incorporate 
several measures of board composition that are commonly associated with board vigilance in an 
agency perspective. Good governance prescriptions deem smaller boards more effective 




Non-executive directors (measured as the percentage of non-executive directors to the total 
numbers of directors) and board independence (measured as the percentage of independent 
directors to the total number of directors) are indicators of the impact of board composition on 
firm performance. The latter reflects the degree to which the board of directors operates 
independently from corporate insiders or major shareholders.
ii
 We also include board meeting 
frequency (measured as the number of board meetings per year) as an additional indicator of 
board vigilance (Vafeas, 1999).  
We complement these conventional board measures with a number of variables 
pertaining to a board’s committee structure, which recent studies suggest are better proxies of 
governance quality (Bruno & Claessens, 2010; Chan & Li, 2003; Yeh, Chung & Liu, 2011). 
Firstly, we include a variable for the number of functional committees (measured from 0 to 5; of 
the audit, risk, compensation, nomination, and strategy committee). Secondly, where they exist 
we also include measures of strategy, risk, nomination, compensation, and auditing committee 
independence, operationalized as the proportion of independent directors in each committee. We 






Incentive Compensation. Finally, based upon the available data, we include two 
measures relating to executive incentive compensation. The first is variable pay, which measures 
the fraction of CEO variable cash bonus to total CEO cash compensation, which is the sum of the 
fixed and the variable part (Grove et al., 2011). The second is the use of a stock option, which is 




To assess the impact of general firm characteristics, we collected the following set of 
control variables: firm age (Peng & Jiang, 2010), firm size measured as the log-value of total 
assets (Mitton, 2002), firm leverage measured as the value of debt divided by the value of total 
assets (Lang & Stulz, 1994), firm diversification (Mitton, 2002), and market-to-book ratio (Rajan 
& Zingales, 1998). A dummy variable for firms that have a listed American Depository Receipt 
(ADR) was also included, as recent literature suggests that a cross-listing might allow firms 
operating in a poor legal environment to bond themselves to a better institutional framework 
(Salva, 2003). Also included as control variables are several indicators of CEO and board 
educational and prior work experience characteristics, which have been identified as having 
some material impact on firm performance (Simzek, 2007). We include as variables CEO age 
(measured as the difference between the book year and the year of birth of the CEO), CEO 
tenure (measured as the number of years the executive has been CEO), CEO elite education (a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO has obtained his/her degree in a globally renowned 
academic institution) and CEO outside board functions (number of outside board functions the 




board financial experience (average number of years of professional experience in the financial 
sector of the board members) and board financial education (number of board members with a 
degree in finance or trained as accountants/auditors/financial consultants). Table 1 presents the 
definitions, data sources, and basic statistics of all firm-specific variables. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 here 
    -------------------------------- 
 
Institutional Variables 
To investigate cross-country institutional differences, comparative corporate governance 
and international business studies typically use several proxies to measure the quality of 
countries’ institutions: (1) a proxy measuring the general quality of the legal system (Heugens, 
Van Essen, & Van Oosterhout, 2009), (2) a proxy measuring investor protection (Liu & 
Magnam, 2011; Engelen & Van Essen, 2010) and creditor protection (Carney et al., 2011), and 
(3) quality of financial system (Carpenter et al., 2010). To measure the impact of the overall 
quality of legal background institutions in various European jurisdictions, we used Kaufmann et 
al.’s (2009) ‘Rule of law’ and ‘Corruption index’ measures. The Rule of law variable measures 
the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, while the 
Corruption index measures the exercise of public power for private gain (Kaufmann et al., 2009). 
A higher score on the Corruption index reflects less corruption, while a higher score for the Rule 
of law implies more confidence in the legal system.  
To measure the impact of the jurisdictional level of legal protection against the misuse of 
corporate assets by directors or large shareholders for their personal gain, we used the Doing 
Business ‘Protecting investors’ indicator provided by the World Bank and the Spamann (2010) 




used Djankov et al.’s (2007) ‘Creditor right protection index’. Djankov et al. (2007) and 
Djankov et al. (2008a) show that stronger creditor rights lead to increased availability of credit.  
Finally, we also distinguished between market- and bank-based financial systems. We 
followed the methodology of Demirguc-Kunt & Levine (2001) to classify a country as having a 
‘Market- versus bank-based financial system’ in order to test whether the distinction between 
both financial architectures is an important determinant of firm performance in times of crisis. 
Table 2 presents the definitions, sources, and basic statistics of the country-specific variables. 
Table 3 reports all correlations for the dependent and main independent firm-level variables in 
our regressions.  
           -------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 2 and 3 here 
               -------------------------------- 
 
Sample Description 
Table 4 presents sample description across the 26 countries included in our sample. The 
table shows that there are considerable differences in corporate governance practices across 
Europe. High levels of ownership concentration, measured by the percentage of shares held by 
the largest shareholder, can be found in Estonia, the Czech Republic, Poland and Turkey, while 
the UK, Switzerland and Sweden exhibit low levels of ownership concentration. Family 
ownership of publicly listed firms are prevalent in France, Italy and Greece, while institutional 
shareholders are more common in the Netherlands, Ireland and Sweden. With a few notable 
exceptions among central European states such as Czech Republic and Hungary government 
ownership of publicly listed corporations is relatively low in Europe. Consistent with Facio & 
Lang (2002), we find that largest shareholders have often more voting than cash flow rights, 





Insert Table 4 here 
     -------------------------------- 
 
With regard to board structure and composition, CEO duality occurs most frequently in 
Czech and French firms and less frequently in Danish, Swedish and British firms. While the 
average board size across the full sample is 11 board members, we can see that boards in 
Lithuania (5 members), Estonia (7 members) and Turkey (8 members) are relatively small, while 
Germany (14 members), Portugal (14 members) and Hungary (14 members) have on average 
larger boards. The most independent boards are to be found in Finnish, Swiss, British and Dutch 
companies, while Estonian, German, Polish and Latvian companies are characterized by low 
levels of independence. On average, European boards of directors meet every one and a half 
months. Austrian (5 meetings) and German (5 meetings) boards assemble much less frequently, 
while Turkish companies (18 meetings) meet nearly every three weeks. The presence of 
functional committees also varies widely across European countries. Functional committees are 
very scarce and do not exist in the Baltic countries, Denmark and Poland, while the UK, 
Switzerland and Belgium have about three committees with the board. British and Irish 
companies have the highest number of independent committees, while Czech, Hungarian and 
Turkish companies have hardly any independent committees. Finally, table 4 shows that there is 
considerable variance between countries in the use of incentive compensation. Compensation 
through stock options is common among Irish, Luxembourg, Norwegian, Swedish and Swiss 
firms, while fixed pay seems to be the rule in Cypriot, Czech Republic, and Finnish firms. 
   




Much of the comparative cross-country literature in corporate governance relies on OLS 
type regression (e.g. Aggarwal et al., 2010; Durnev & Kim, 2005; Klapper & Love, 2004). 
However, in this paper we adopt an alternative analytical method. We analyze our data using 
Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) (Raudenbush & Bryck, 2002). The advantage of this 
analytical strategy is due to the hierarchical nature of the sample, in which firms are nested 
within countries. Nesting is a form of dependence which occurs in data where there are multiple 
levels and where lower level units are members of a higher level group (Holcomb et al., 2010). 
Hierarchical nesting means that firms within a country will be more similar, on average, than 
firms from different countries for instance because they share the same legal governance 
environment. We formally test whether firms are nested within countries in the next section 
(HLM null model).  
One of the standard assumptions of most statistical techniques is the assumption of 
observation independence. If this assumption is violated, and in hierarchical structured data this 
is almost always the case, OLS regression techniques obtain standard errors that are too small for 
the parameters estimates, seriously affecting statistical significance testing and result 
interpretation (Hox, 2002;). The primary advantage of HLM is that it explicitly recognizes and 
corrects for the problem of hierarchical data (Holcomb et al, 2010). Indeed, the use of 
hierarchical modeling is likely to increase in the fields of finance (e.g. Engelen & Van Essen, 
2010; Kayo & Kimura, 2011) and management literature (e.g. Grosvold & Brammer, 2011; 
Misangyi et al., 2006) as the preferred method for the analysis of nested data.  
Our dataset contains a hierarchical structure with two levels (country and firm), each of 
which is represented by its own regression equation. The level 1 model predictors are firm-




slopes and intercept at the level 1 model are allowed to differ across countries, an advantage that 
cannot be obtained through utilizing ordinary linear regression.  
Analytically level 1 model can be expressed as: 
ijijjjij eXY  110   [1] 
and the level 2 model as: 
jj Z101000    [2] 
jj Z111101    [3] 
where 
ijY  is cumulative stock return, X s are firm-specific variables and Zs are country-specific 
variables. 
With HLM we can run a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) to measure how much 
of the variance of the stock market performance can be explained by country-specific 
characteristics versus firm-specific characteristics (HLM null model). We executed the different 
analyses using the HLM 6 software package (Raudenbush et al., 2004). Our HLM models 
employ the robust standard errors generated by the HLM software package, as these relax the 
assumptions of the variance-covariance matrix (Hox, 2002). 
 
RESULTS 
Firstly, we begin our analysis with a simple random ANOVA model (HLM null model) 
to calculate the corrected overall average stock market return. Secondly, following Yeh et al. 
(2011) and Grove et al. (2011) we employ the same dates in their pre- and crisis period analysis. 
In order to establish a baseline condition for good corporate governance in the steady-state we 
ran the HLM full model on the sample in the period prior to the onset of the Transatlantic 




helped during a financial crisis we ran the full HLM model following the onset of the 
transatlantic financial crisis (i.e. July 2007-December 2008). Fourthly, as a robustness check we 
also perform the same procedure with OLS regression. Fifthly, because some scholars attribute 
the financial crisis to the behavior of firms in the financial sector, we tested for differences 
between financial and nonfinancial companies.  
 
HLM Null Model 
Table 5 shows the results of the one-way ANOVA with random effects.
iii
 The results 
support our decision to use HLM, as we found significant variation among countries (variance 
component = .02, df = 25, p value = 0.000). About 25% of the variance in firm performance is 
between countries. We found similar results when we extended this period until March 2009 as 
robustness check.
iv
           
        -------------------------------- 
      Insert Tables 5-7 here 
         -------------------------------- 
 
HLM Full Model Main Effects 
 
Corporate Governance in Steady-State Conditions. To establish the baseline condition 
Models 1 to 7 in Table 6 report the results of firm-level and country-level corporate governance 
characteristics in steady-state conditions. Model 1 incorporates ownership structure, board 
structure (except board independence and committee independence variables), incentive 
compensation and control variables. Model 2 introduces the board independence measure, and 
model 3 introduces the committee independence variables. Models 4, 5, 6, and 7 introduce 
different combinations of country specific indicators to a reduced set of firm level predictors. In 




from 1179 to 437 observations. The HLM results for steady-state conditions show that virtually 
none of the governance measures have any significant impact on firm performance. Of the board 
characteristics, only auditing independence and compensation committee independence are 
significant but the signs point in different directions. We note that firm leverage contribute 
sometimes significantly positive to firm profitability in the steady-state. Of the country specific 
predictors Table 6 shows that rule of law (model 6) and market financial systems (models 4, 5 
and 6) are significant, indicating that being located in a market oriented financial system helps 
firms outperform firms located in bank based financial systems. Taken together, these findings 
do not provide a ringing endorsement of good governance principles, but suggest that good 
governance does little harm to the performance of Europe's public corporations in steady-state 
circumstances. 
 
Corporate Governance in Crisis Conditions. We repeat the procedure for the crisis 
period and the differences in results are striking. Table 7 presents the results. With regard to 
ownership structure we find a clear negative impact of ownership wedge on firm performance in 
all models (1 to 7). These results suggest that firms that employ pyramid or dual class shares lose 
on average 4 percent of their market value in a financial crisis. The result clearly supports 
Hypothesis 1a and lends support to the view that the good governance prescription of equating 
voting and cash flow rights can be helpful in a crisis. In contrast, the results provide no support 
for the view that relational owners with longer investment horizons are more likely to prop up 
their firms during a crisis. The effect of corporate or family largest shareholders is insignificant 
in all models and thus we reject hypothesis 1b. Surprisingly, and contrary to our expectations, 




and we therefore reject hypothesis 1c. Institutional ownership has a significantly positive impact 
on performance in models 1 to 3, suggesting that institutional owners’ interest in maximizing 
returns from their equity stake will be undiminished in the context of the crisis, although the 
variable becomes insignificant when we add level 2 predictors. Perhaps most surprising is the 
finding that government ownership is significantly positive in all models. While much prior 
research suggests that state owned firms underperform their private counterparts (Boardman & 
Vining, 1989; Dewenter & Malatesta, 2001) these results suggest government owners may 
respond to financial crises by helping out underperforming firms. Moreover, anticipation of 
government support may encourage creditors and suppliers to maintain their commitments to a 
firm and so improve its chances of returning to profitability.  
The results provide relatively strong support for hypotheses 2, namely that vigilant 
boards will have a negative impact in the context of the crisis. The CEO duality measure is 
significant and positive in all models suggesting that greater managerial discretion is more 
important than board vigilance in a crisis. Similarly, the number of board committees measure is 
negative and significant in model 1 and 2, suggesting that a complex board structure can inhibit 
managerial discretion, which can delay managerial responses to the unfolding events. Contrary to 
good governance prescriptions board size is significant and positive in several models in Table 7. 
Generally, the measures pertaining to board and committee independence are insignificant, 
suggesting that these good governance prescriptions are not helpful in crisis conditions. We 
suggest the balance of these indicators support hypothesis 2, namely that overly vigilant boards 





The estimates reported in Table 7 provide strong support for hypothesis 3. Both incentive 
compensation variables are negative and significant in models 1 to 3. Firms using high-powered 
incentives to motivate senior executives, such as stock options and variable pay, will suffer 
during the financial crisis because executives may seek to optimize the pay in ways that are not 
optimal for firm investors (Fahlenbrach & Stulz, 2010; Judge, et al., 2011).  
When we incorporate the country-level institutional variables as level 2 predictors to our 
base models (Model 4 to 7) we find that the general quality of the legal system, operationalized 
by the rule of law variable, is positively related to firm performance during the financial crisis, 
and lends support to hypothesis 4a. Indeed, our assessment of the economic effect of rule of law 
on firm performance suggests that one standard deviation increase in rule of law is associated 
with an increase in stock market return of some 4 percent. Interestingly, high-quality law is 
beneficial in both steady-state and crisis conditions. However, the results for other country level 
indicators are more nuanced. Measures of the corruption index show no impact on firm 
performance in either crisis or steady-state conditions. Contrary to our expectations, if 
expropriation becomes more severe during a crisis (Mitton, 2002) then we should expect to see a 
positive impact of shareholder protection provisions on firm performance. However, neither the 
World Bank’s Doing Business Shareholder Protection Index in Models 4 and 5 nor Spamann 
(2010) Anti-Director Rights Index in Models 6 and 7 show any beneficial impact upon firm 
financial performance during the crisis. In marked contrast the level of Creditor right protection, 
which had no significant impact in steady-state conditions, has a significant positive impact on 
firm performance in all four models, lending support for hypothesis 4a. This result is consistent 
with Djankov et al. (2007, 2008a) who shows that strong creditor protection is associated with 




creditor rights-protection is especially valuable during a credit crisis. The economics of creditor 
rights protection is of the same order as the rule of law, and a one standard deviation increase in 
creditor rights is associated with an increase in stock market returns of 4 percent.  
Finally, our results show that the performance advantage for firms located in market-
based systems in steady-state conditions will disappear in a crisis. While Table 6 shows that the 
market financial system is significantly positive in the steady-state, Models 4 to 7 in Table 7 
show that the distinction between bank-based and market-based financial system has no 
significant impact on firm performance during the financial crisis. Thus while market-based 
systems are comparatively performance-friendly in steady-state conditions they may lose their 
comparative advantage in a crisis where both credit and equity financing are scarce. 
  
ROBUSTNESS TESTS AND EXTENSIONS 
In this section we test for the robustness of our crisis period findings by running OLS 
regressions as an alternative to HLM regressions and by splitting our sample in financial and 
non-financial firms. 
 
OLS Regression Results 
Although we make a strong case for the use of HLM, we test the robustness of our crisis 
period findings by running OLS regressions, which have hitherto been more common in the 
literature. The OLS results largely confirm our HLM results.
v
 Both OLS and HLM indicate a 
positive impact of government ownership, board size, board frequency, an independent 
nomination committee, CEO duality, and of firm size. Both models also show a negative impact 
of ownership wedge, the number of functional committees, the use of stock option plans, 




There are a few minor differences between the models. OLS does not find a positive 
impact of institutional ownership. When we introduce the country-level institutional variables 
into the model, we see that both OLS and HLM indicate the positive impact of the Rule of Law 
and of the Creditor Right Protection index. In contrast to the HLM model, the OLS shows a 
negative impact of the World Bank’s Doing Business Shareholder Protection index on firm 
performance during crisis times, as well as a negative impact of market-based financial systems . 
Overall, the OLS regressions affirm the robustness of our HLM results. 
 
Financial versus Non-Financial Firms 
Because research on the US financial crisis implicates poor governance practices in the 
financial sector as a causal factor (Gregoriu, 2009) we can distinguish between financial and 
non-financial companies to test whether their respective performance during the crisis is driven 
by different governance factors. We can observe some important differences between both types 
of firms. The performance of non-financial firms is negatively influenced by the variable 
ownership wedge and positively by board size and CEO duality (except in one model), while 
those effects are not present in our financial firms subsample. Grove et al. (2011) found that 
there was no impact of CEO duality on the performance of financial firms in the crisis period and 
that there was a negative relationship in the pre-crisis period. We also find that financial firms 
with a greater fraction non-executive directors experience better firm performance during a 
crisis, while it tends to have no effect on non-financial firms. Williams & Nguyen (2005) and 
Yeh, Chung & Liu (2011) also stress the importance of independent directors for financial 
institutions during crisis times. Both financial and non-financial firms are adversely influenced 




plans (Chen, Steiner & Whyte, 2006), while non-financial firms are negatively influenced by 
variable pay. 
When we compare the country-level institutional variables, we can observe that the firm 
performance of non-financial firms is positively influenced by the Rule of Law, while we cannot 
observe this effect for financial firms. Both types of firms seem to benefit from better creditor 
rights during the crisis. The firm performance of financial firms is negatively influenced by 
shareholder protection rights; a result that is similar to the findings of Beltratti and Stulz (2009). 
The overall conclusion from comparing both subsamples is that our main results are mostly valid 
for non-financial firms and cannot be completely generalized to financial firms (Grove et al., 
2011). 
 
LIMITATIONS OF OUR STUDY 
There are some potential concerns with the HLM approach used to test our hypotheses. The first 
concern relates to the number of countries and firms per country available in our sample because 
the statistical power required to test relationships through HLM is affected by the number of 
groups and the number of members per group (Holcomb et al., 2010; Scherbaum & Ferreter, 
2009). There is, however, conflicting literature on HLM regarding power requirements. For 
instance, Kreft & De Leeuw (1998) recommend 20 or more groups with a minimum group size 
of 5, while Maas & Hox (2005) call for sample sizes larger than 30. LaHuis and Ferguson (2009) 
find that increasing the number of members has a stronger effect on the power than increasing 
the number of groups. Scherbaum & Ferreter (2009) perform simulations to test the impact of the 
number of groups and group size on the power of testing. For medium effect sizes they find that 
35 groups with 9 members per group or 30 groups with 14 members leads to the conventional 




70%, while increasing the number of member above 30 allows to reach again 80%. This would 
require a total sample size of 750 observations. Our sample comprised 26 groups with on average 
46 members per group, or a total sample size of 1197, will therefore generate sufficient statistical 
power. The number of countries in our data set is also higher than in similar studies
vi
, and it has 
more firms than for example Holcomb et al. (2010) who use 35 groups with average of 9 
members (total sample size of 308) in their entrepreneurial finance study.  
 Secondly, like most other comparative corporate governance studies, our results may be 
subject to potential endogeneity. Although HLM corrects for observation dependence, it does not 
correct for endogeneity. Chhaochharia and Laeven (2009) point out that the corporate 
governance literature does not offer any suitable instruments to perform such an analysis. 
Similarly, Larcker, Richardson and Tuma note that in corporate governance research 
‘instrumental variables are weak predictors of the endogenous variables and the instrumental 
variables are themselves partially endogenous” (2007, p.1003). They conclude that it is difficult 
to use instrumental variables to address endogeneity issues in corporate governance settings. We 
sought to control for the endogenous nature of firm-level corporate governance variables as 
much as possible by lagging all our firm- and country-level independent variables (Durnev & 
Kim, 2005; Peng & Jiang, 2010). Such concerns have been further reduced as the global 
financial crisis was unanticipated by market participants, offering a natural experiment (Yeh, et 
al., 2011). Furthermore, a common way to control for endogeneity is to use 2SLS rather than use 
OLS results. As a further check we use the standard Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of endogeneity. 
As Baum (2006) suggests, the test is perhaps best interpreted not as a test for the endogeneity or 
the exogeneity of regressors per se, but rather as a test of the consequences of using different 




favors using the 2SLS instead of OLS models estimates (Baum, 2006). In our case, the 
endogeneity test does not favor the use of 2SLS model instead of OLS (DWH-test statistics is 
significant at 0.38 level). So while we cannot completely eliminate concerns about endogeneity 
we recognize that it might limit our conclusions. In the worst case, we can only interpret our 
results as partial correlations (Bruno & Claessens, 2010).  
Thirdly, although we sought to construct variables in a comparable manner across all 
countries in our data set (or use the same data source), it remains possible that differences in the 
definition or measurement of variables might vary between the countries in our sample. For 
instance, differences in disclosure about which compensation is included in the variable part 
(bonus, shares, and pension rights) might distort the calculation of the fraction variable versus 
fixed pay. This is a caveat to take into account when interpreting our results. 
 
DISCUSSION  
Using a large sample of 1197 firms from 26 European countries, we tested whether good 
governance influence firm performance in steady-state conditions versus times of distress. 
Through the application of hierarchical linear modeling, our study offers the first test of the 
combined effects of firm- and country-level governance. We are able to simultaneously model 
firm-level influences of ownership effects, board vigilance, incentive compensation, and the 
quality of country-level corporate governance institutions. Through this procedure we were able 
to show that country level institutions explain some 25 percent of the heterogeneity in firm 
performance. Most importantly we were able to show that the influences of several firm- and 
country-specific good governance prescriptions have different effects in steady-state and crisis 
conditions. Taken together, the findings contribute to the growing body of literature that suggest 




firm specific contingencies (Aguilera et al., 2008; Desender et al., 2012; Dowell, Shackell & 
Stuart, 2011; Judge, 2012). The research implication is that scholars should investigate the extent 
to which governance prescriptions are universally valuable or whether their prescriptive value is 
contingent upon the existence and interaction with other factors. 
  Our findings on ownership structure are consistent with law and finance literature’s best 
practice prescription of ‘one-share one-vote’ (Nenova, 2003). We found that an ownership 
wedge, and the inequality of cash-flow and voting rights, can be harmful in a crisis. This 
suggests that firms should eschew the use of excess-control devices, such as pyramids and dual 
class shares to increase their robustness to financial shocks. However, we found no support for 
our hypotheses that relational owners, such as families and corporations, may be able to increase 
the resilience of their firms by ‘propping’ them up in adverse conditions (Vilallonga & Amit, 
2010). One possible explanation for this negative finding is that powerful relational owners may 
be prone to ‘over-monitoring’ and excessive interference in management decision-making 
(Burkurt, Gromb & Panunzi, 1997). The consequences of owner interference may lead to 
confusion about who is in charge and crowd-out management ability to respond quickly to 
market turbulence (Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1984). This ‘over-monitoring’ interpretation is 
consistent with our hypotheses that vigilant boards may unduly constrain the discretion of the 
CEO, since we find that CEO duality is helpful in a crisis whereas small board size and large 
numbers of board sub-committees harms performance and the much lauded board independence 
indicators have no significant effect.  
In this regard, financial crises often beget more complex and stringent rules (Romano, 
2004) but continued strengthening of governance mechanisms may represent too much of a good 




oversight may be well intentioned, excessive monitoring can have dysfunctional consequences if 
they inhibit the executive's ability to manage (Finklestein & Hambrick, 1984). Indeed, excessive 
interference compromises the division of labour between owners and management, which is the 
reason owners appoint professional executives in the first place (Williamson, 2007). We 
recommend that future research should consider the trade-off between managerial oversight and 
discretion and investigate the differences between strong and optimal corporate governance 
mechanisms. Moreover, more research is needed to understand optimal governance since there 
are evident trade-offs between desirable governance components. For example, communication 
in large boards can be cumbersome, yet small boards may be overwhelmed and unable to help to 
manage the committee requirements of the public firm (Dowell, Shackell & Stuart, 2011).  
Perhaps the strongest support for our argument that good governance practices can be 
counterproductive in crisis is in our finding regarding the pernicious effects of incentive 
compensation. We find that the neutral effects of stock options and variable payment schemes in 
the steady-state become harmful in a crisis, a view that is consistent with Conyon, Judge & 
Useem (2011) who consider whether economically rational pay practices may have exacerbated 
the effects of financial crises because “executives sought to optimize their pay in ways that were 
not optimal for the firm nor its investors” (p. 403). On this point we observe that the control 
variable for leverage has the largest and most significant negative effect on firm performance 
throughout the crisis. Insofar as stock options incentivize executives to leverage up the firm’s 
capital structure (Mehran, 1992) then leverage, which has a strongly beneficial effect on firm 
performance in steady-state conditions, in combination with high-powered incentives, may prove 




Our country-level finding that the Rule of Law index is beneficial in both the steady-state 
and in financial adversity is consistent with research that suggests the primary institutional 
advantage of advanced economies, such as those comprising the majority of countries in our 
sample, resides in the overall quality of a jurisdiction’s legal framework (Haggard & Tiede, 
2011). The finding that superior Creditor Right Protection was beneficial for firms in this 
financial crisis is not surprising given the credit squeeze presenting a major challenge to 
European firms. On the other hand, the finding that superior measures of investor protection, as 
indicated by ‘Investors Protection’ and ‘Anti-director rights index’, do not have a positive 
impact on firm performance during the financial crisis may be surprising to scholars in the law 
and finance tradition. However, protection for minority investors has improved significantly in 
many European jurisdictions over the last decade. And the relative ineffectiveness of such 
provisions in the recent crisis suggests that continuing increases in protection may be subject to 
diminishing returns. For example, Bruno and Claessens (2010) suggest that the effects of 
stringent country legal corporate governance requirement are neutral or negative.  
Moreover, our finding that firms located in market based systems enjoy a comparative 
advantage in steady-state conditions but lose that advantage in crisis is consistent with Beltratti 
and Stulz’s (2009) findings that some shareholder-friendly corporate governance mechanisms are 
counterproductive in a crisis. While we did not find that firms located in bank-based systems 
enjoyed better profitability in the crisis, it is possible the banks-based systems favor alternative 
corporate governance outcomes. For instance, in a financial crisis, banks may be more concerned 
stabilizing firms’ capital structure rather than improving their profitability. However, we expect 
that the interplay between firm and country level to be complex and our current understanding of 




government mechanisms may be substitutes for one another (Durnev & Kim, 2004; Klapper & 
Love, 2004), but these findings may be unique to emerging markets. A ‘comparative capitalisms’ 
perspective on more advanced economies suggests that firms develop strong complementarities 
with a country level financial system (Aggrawal et al., 2010; Hall & Soskice, 2001). 
Alternatively, they may have no impact on each another (Chhaochharia & Laeven, 2009). More 
research is warranted.  
 
CONCLUSION 
So do good governance principles as prescribed by agency theory matter in a crisis? Our study 
provides a nuanced answer to the question. Some prescriptions, such as the equality of cash flow 
and voting rights, the rule of law and creditor protection, are especially beneficial for firms in a 
crisis. However, other good governance prescriptions such as board independence, incentive 
compensation, and the separation of CEO & board chair, have on the whole proved harmful to 
firm performance in crisis times. Our interpretation suggests that governance prescriptions aimed 
at constraining executive discretion need to be optimized rather than maximized if executives are 
to be empowered to cope with difficult environments. Moreover, the growing interdependence of 
financial systems facilitates contagion and may increase the incidence of financial shocks. If so 
the ability to manage turbulence will be at a premium. The implication is that corporate 
governance prescriptions could be better optimized for periods of munificence where the primary 
emphasis is upon maximizing shareholder wealth and for periods of the adversity where the 





Table 1. Description and Summary of the Firm-Specific Variables (Level 1) 
Variable Description Source Year Statistics  
    Obs. Mean SD 
Cumulative stock return 
(RAW1) 
Total stock return between 1 July 2007 and 31 December 2008. DataStream and Thomson  1197 -0.56 0.23 
Cumulative stock return 
(RAW2)  
Total stock return between the 1 July 2007 and 31 March 2009 
(alternative measure). 
DataStream and Thomson  1197 -0.59 0.24 
Cumulative stock return 
(RAWN1)  
Total stock return between 1 July 2005 and 31 December 2006. DataStream and Thomson  1197 0.53 0.65 
Cumulative stock return 
(RAWN2) 
Total stock return between the 1 July 2005 and 31 March 2007 
(alternative measure). 
DataStream and Thomson  1197 0.63 0.75 
Cumulative abnormal return 
(CRISIS1) 
Total abnormal return (adjusted industry) between 1 July 2007 and 31 
December 2008. 
DataStream and Thomson  1197 0.01 0.23 
Cumulative abnormal return 
(CRISIS2) 
Total abnormal return (adjusted industry) between the 1 July 2007 
and 31 March 2009 (alternative measure). 
DataStream and Thomson  1197 0.01 0.23 
Cumulative abnormal return 
(NORMAL1) 
Total abnormal return (adjusted industry) between 1 July 2005 and 31 
December 2006. 
DataStream and Thomson  1197 0.00 0.63 
Cumulative abnormal return 
(NORMAL2)  
Total abnormal return (adjusted industry) between the 1 July 2005 
and 31 March 2007 (alternative measure). 
DataStream and Thomson  1197 -0.00 0.73 
Corporate largest blockholder 
(CLB) 
The largest shareholder is a corporate owner with more than 10% of 
the (ownership rights of the) shares. 










Family largest blockholder 
(FLB) 
The largest shareholder is a family owner with more than 10% of the 
(ownership rights of the) shares. 












The largest shareholder is the government with more than 10% of the 
(ownership rights of the) shares. 










Institution largest blockholder 
(ILB) 
The largest shareholder is an institutional owner with more than 10% 
of the (ownership rights of the) shares. 










Widely held firm (WHF) There is no shareholder with more than 10% of the (voting rights of 
the) shares 










Ownership wedge (WEDGE) A dummy variable that is 1 for firms where there is difference 
between control rights and cash-flow rights of the largest shareholder. 




















Non-executive directors (NED) A variable measuring the percentage of non-executive directors to the 
total number of directors. 













Table 1. Description and Summary of the Firm-Specific Variables (Level 1: Continued)  
Variable Description Source Year Statistics  
    Obs. Mean SD 
 
Board independence (BI) A variable measuring the percentage of independent directors to the 
total number of directors. 
Annual reports, company 

















Number of board committees 
(NUMCOM) 
The number of committees a board appoints (auditing, compensation, 
nomination, risk, and strategy committee). 
























































CEO duality (CD) Situation where the positions of board chairman and CEO are held by 
one individual. 
Annual reports, company 









Variable pay (VARIAB)  A variable measuring the fraction of CEO variable cash bonus to total 
CEO cash compensation. 








Stock option (SOD) A dummy variable that is 1 for firms that adoption stock option plans, 
and 0 for firm not using stock options. 











Table 1. Description and Summary of the Firm-Specific Variables (Level 1: Continued)  
 
  
Variable Description Source Year Statistics  
    Obs. Mean SD 
CEO age (AGE) CEO age is the difference between the book year and the year of birth 
of the CEO 








CEO tenure (TENURE) CEO tenure is operationalized as the number of years the executive 
has been CEO 








CEO elite education (ELITE) A dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO has obtained his/her degree 
in a globally renowned academic institution  








CEO outside board functions 
(CEOOUT) 
The number of outside board functions the CEO holds within other 
corporations. 
Annual reports, company 









Board financial experience 
(FINEX) 
Is the average number of years of professional experience in the 
financial sector of the board members with financial experience. 










Board financial education 
(FINED) 
The number of board members with a degree in Finance or trained as 
accountants/auditors/financial consultants 










Cross-listed (CL) A dummy variable that is 1 for firms that have a listed American 



















Firm age (FA) A variable measuring the logarithm of number of years since the 









Firm leverage (FL) A variable reflecting the degree of leverage of the firm, measured as 









Market to book value 
 



















Table 2. Description and Summary of the Country-Specific Variables (Level 2) 
Variable Description Source Year Statistics  
    Obs. Mean SD 
Rule of law A variable which measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by 
the rules of society in year 2004 and 2006. These include perceptions of the incidence 
of violent and non-violent crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, 
and the enforceability of contracts. A higher value means a better rule of law.  










Corruption index The corruption index measures ‘‘the exercise of public power for private gain” in year 
2004 and 2006. It captures aspects ranging from the frequency of additional payments 
to get things done to the effects of corruption on the business environment. A higher 
score means less corruption. 












The strength of minority shareholder protections against misuse of corporate assets by 
insiders and large owners in year 2004 and 2006. A higher value means more 













Measuring the protection of shareholders on 6 components. Three are concerned with 
shareholder voting (voting by mail, voting without blocking of shares, and calling an 
extraordinary meeting), and three with minority protection (proportional board 
representation, preemptive rights, and judicial remedies). A higher value means more 
protection of minority shareholders. 
Spamann, 2010 2002 26 3.68 0.99 
Creditor right 
protection 
Creditor right protection, an index aggregating different creditor rights. A higher value 
means better creditor protection. 
Djankov et al., 2007 2002 26 1.88 0.97 
Market financial 
system 
A dummy variable that equals 1 if the country’s financial system is market-based and 
0 if it is bank-based.  
Demirguc-Kunt and 
Levine, 2001 




 Table 3. Pearson Correlations between Main Variables in Our Model for Crisis Times 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
1. NORMAL1/ 
CRISIS1 
1.00 0.92** -0.01  0.02   0.07* -0.02 -0.02  0.00  0.14**  0.01 -0.04 -0.07* -0.02 -0.07*  0.03  0.08* -0.03  0.08  0.06† -0.06† -0.10** 
2. NORMAL2/ 
CRISIS2 
 1.00 -0.02  0.02   0.04  0.00 -0.03  0.01  0.07*  0.02 -0.01 -0.04  0.00 -0.05  0.02  0.05 -0.07  0.05  0.03 -0.02  0.08* 
3. CLB    1.00 -0.31** -0.15** -0.34** -0.27** -0.08** -0.02  0.09** -0.17**  0.12** -0.06† -0.19** -0.25** -0.17** -0.07  0.08  0.00 -0.06* -0.06 
4. FLB     1.00 -0.14** -0.34** -0.29**  0.34** -0.10** -0.14** -0.14** -0.08** -0.22** -0.10** -0.09* -0.04 -0.07 -0.02  0.11** -0.13**  0.00 
5. GLB      1.00 -0.16** -0.13** -0.11**  0.12**  0.11**  0.07*  0.05†  0.00  0.04  0.06†  0.03  0.04 0.11*  0.00 -0.03 -0.06* 
6. ILB       1.00 -0.20** -0.07* -0.02 -0.01  0.08*  0.01  0.09**  0.08*  0.11**  0.01  0.01  0.00 -0.06†  0.10** -0.04 
7. WHF        1.00 -0.14**  0.06*  0.00  0.20** -0.09**  0.22**  0.20**  0.18**  0.18**  0.09 -0.10* -0.05†  0.12**  0.08* 
8. WEDGE         1.00 -0.05  0.01  0.02 -0.05† -0.08** -0.06† -0.09* -0.13** -0.07  0.02  0.06†  0.00 -0.10** 
9. BS          1.00  0.04 -0.18** -0.12**  0.14** -0.15**  0.04  0.12**  0.18**  0.20**  0.00  0.00  0.21** 
10. NED           1.00 0.18**  0.20**  0.07* -0.10** -0.13** -0.22** -0.08 -0.07 -0.04  0.05 -0.05 
11. BI            1.00 -0.06*  0.37**  0.61**  0.60**  0.45**  0.18**  0.06 -0.06†  0.07* -0.07* 
12. FREQ             1.00 -0.02 -0.09** -0.28** -0.23** -0.10† -0.16** -0.04 -0.05 -0.15** 
13. NUMCOM              1.00  0.38**  0.42**  0.51**  0.30**  0.12* -0.01  0.10**  0.08* 
14. AUDITIND               1.00  0.67**  0.52**  0.13*  0.04  0.02  0.08* -0.06† 
15. COMIND                1.00  0.73**  0.20**  0.15** -0.04  0.08*  0.08† 
16. NOMIND                 1.00  0.35**  0.23**  0.07†  0.01  0.11** 
17. RISKIND                  1.00  0.53**  0.11* -0.16*  0.09* 
18. STAIND                   1.00  0.05 -0.13*  0.01 
19. CD                    1.00 -0.08* -0.03 
20. SOD                     1.00  0.14** 
21. VARIAB                      1.00 
This table reports Pearson correlation coefficients between main variables for crisis times. Please see table 1 for detailed definitions of the variables.  



































This table presents cross-country mean values of firm specific corporate governance variables used in the study. The mean of 2006 values are reported in the cell for each 
country. CRISIS1: Total abnormal return between 1/07/2007 and 31/12/2008. CRISIS2: Total abnormal return between 1/07/2007 and 31/03/2009. CLB: Corporate largest 
blockholder. FLB: Family largest blockholder. GLB: Government largest blockholder. ILB: Institution largest blockholder. WHF: Widely held firm. WEDGE: Ownership 
wedge. BS: Board size. NED: Non-executive directors. BI: Board independence. FREQ: Board frequency. NUMCOM: Number of board committees. AUDITIND: Auditing 
independence. COMIND: Compensation independence. NOMIND: Nomination independence. RISKIND: Risk independence. STAIND: Strategy independence. CD: CEO 




Country (obs) CRISIS1 CRISIS2 CLB FLB GLB ILB WHF WEDGE BS NED BI FREQ NUMCOM 
Austria (20) -0.01  0.01 0.24 0.22 0.15 0.37 0.02 0.48 13.47 0.71 0.49 5.38 1.79 
Belgium (20)  0.04  0.05 0.40 0.32 0.03 0.15 0.11 0.32 10.11 0.80 0.41 7.63 2.59 
Cyprus (10) -0.27 -0.27 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.33 0.33 0.50 8.63 0.69 0.39 21.00 3.00 
Czech Republic (10)   0.33  0.25 0.33 0.00 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.33 13.00 0.66 0.16  2.42 
Denmark (20) -0.02 -0.06 0.32 0.16 0.11 0.26 0.18 0.45 10.37 0.21 0.23 8.15 0.56 
Estonia (11) -0.03 -0.05 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 7.00 0.43 0.00 12.66 0.00 
Finland (25) -0.01  0.00 0.25 0.17 0.23 0.15 0.21 0.34 9.94 0.77 0.59 11.82 1.78 
France (120)  0.01  0.00 0.30 0.40 0.02 0.16 0.20 0.55 11.49 0.78 0.32 6.64 2.33 
Germany (200)  0.09  0.04 0.22 0.36 0.04 0.17 0.21 0.19 14.35 0.68 0.06 5.03 1.00 
Greece (20) -0.07 -0.07 0.18 0.44 0.18 0.15 0.06 0.29 10.60 0.64 0.27 8.80 1.50 
Hungary (10)  0.05 -0.02 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 14.00 0.56 0.27  1.67 
Ireland (63) -0.11 -0.11 0.09 0.16 0.07 0.44 0.29 0.15 9.73 0.65 0.52 7.92 2.73 
Italy (69)  0.00 -0.02 0.21 0.45 0.09 0.17 0.08 0.45 12.25 0.77 0.44 10.50 1.60 
Latvia (7) -0.09 -0.06 0.25 0.25 0.00 0.25 0.25 0.20 11.00 0.60 0.13  0.00 
Lithuania (16) -0.24 -0.25 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 5.33 0.59 0.25  0.00 
Luxembourg (11)  0.10  0.11 0.17 0.18 0.08 0.42 0.25 0.45 11.62 0.81 0.35 6.40 2.46 
Netherlands (45) -0.01  0.00 0.20 0.15 0.04 0.41 0.24 0.40 9.02 0.64 0.52 7.07 2.17 
Norway (25) -0.15 -0.10 0.31 0.08 0.18 0.35 0.15 0.31 8.85 0.91 0.37 12.80 1.65 
Poland (30) -0.03 -0.08 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.4 0.00 0.25 13.75 0.60 0.11  0.60 
Portugal (20)  0.07  0.08 0.43 0.21 0.00 0.29 0.15 0.53 14.13 0.55 0.26 10.29 1.73 
Slovenia (10) -0.01  0.03 0.67 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.00 0.75 0.00  1.00 
Spain (35)  0.10  0.04 0.45 0.15 0.00 0.23 0.23 0.15 13.36 0.81 0.40 12.00 2.91 
Sweden (30) -0.06 -0.02 0.15 0.19 0.04 0.47 0.20 0.65 9.97 0.91 0.47 10.77 2.27 
Switzerland (20)  0.17  0.13 0.00 0.22 0.06 0.22 0.56 0.16 10.24 0.94 0.57 7.35 2.79 
Turkey (100) -0.01  0.02 0.55 0.20 0.04 0.18 0.04 0.26 8.30 0.86 0.11 22.72 1.00 




Table 4. Cross-Country Summary Statistics of Firm specific Corporate Governance Variables for the year 2006 (Continued) 
Country (obs) AUDITIND COMIND NOMIND RISKIND STAIND CD SOD VARIAB 
Austria (20) 0.71 0.78 0.65 0.58 0.71 0.06 0.39 0.24 
Belgium (20) 0.59 0.58 0.53 0.00 0.04 0.06 0.64 0.31 
Cyprus (10) 0.76 0.07 0.37 0.51 0.00 0.11 0.05 0.00 
Czech Republic (10)  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 0.00 0.16 
Denmark (20) 0.60 0.39 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.27 
Estonia (11)      0.00   
Finland (25) 0.85 0.77 0.76 1.00 1.00 0 0.28 0.12 
France (120) 0.53 0.50 0.53 0.28 0.26 0.55 0.52 0.31 
Germany (200) 0.12 0.30 0.20 0.09 0.29 0.06 0.59 0.43 
Greece (20) 0.66 0.57 0.56 0.00 0.00 0.04   
Hungary (10) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00   
Ireland (63) 0.87 0.83 0.81 0.28 0.00 0.11 0.88 0.36 
Italy (69) 0.89 0.69 0.53 0.00 0.42 0.14 0.53 0.34 
Latvia (7)      0.00   
Lithuania (16) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00   
Luxembourg (11) 0.76 0.86 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.21 1 0.47 
Netherlands (45) 0.84 0.78 0.81 0.73 0.79 0.06 0.87 0.35 
Norway (25) 0.54 0.64 0.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.96 0.25 
Poland (30) 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00  
Portugal (20) 0.66 0.31 0.60 0.69 0.00 0.38 0.67 0.37 
Slovenia (10) 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00   
Spain (35) 0.53 0.48 0.58 0.49 0.05 0.21 0.29 0.45 
Sweden (30) 0.70 0.62 0.16 0.42 0.00 0.01 0.93 0.27 
Switzerland (20) 0.74 0.75 0.58 0.71 0.08 0.19 1.00 0.25 
Turkey (100) 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.06   




Table 5. HLM Analyses. Results Firm and Country Characteristics in Normal Times  
 
 
Please see tables 1-2 for detailed definitions of the variables. †, *, ** Denote the coefficient is significant at the 0.10, 
0.05, 0.01 level, respectively (two-tailed test). 
Dependent Variable :       Total abnormal return (adjusted industry) between July 2005 – December 2006 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
Fixed Effect Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
Level 1 predictors        
Corporate largest blockholder  0.03 0.43 0.06 0.86 0.06 1.01 
Family largest blockholder  0.01 0.14 0.02 0.29 0.02 0.29 
Government largest blockholder  0.10 1.11 0.02 0.22 0.02 0.22 
Institution largest blockholder  0.05 0.83 0.03 0.50 0.02 0.33 
Ownership wedge  0.01 0.20 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.21 
Board size  -0.01 -1.01 -0.00 -0.31 -0.01 -1.01 
Non-executive directors  0.06 0.14   0.07 0.30 
Board independence    -0.01 -0.11   
Board frequency  -0.01 -1.00 -0.00 -1.02 0.00 0.30 
CEO duality  -0.01 -0.14 -0.01 -0.14 -0.01 -0.14 
Number of board committees  -0.00 -0.20 0.01 0.50 0.00 0.05 
Auditing independence      -0.30 -2.30* 
Compensation independence      0.15 2.11* 
Nomination independence      -0.06 -0.43 
Risk independence      0.18 1.29 
Strategy independence      -0.55 -1.61 
Stock option  -0.02 -0.33 -0.02 -0.33 -0.03 -0.92 
Variable pay  -0.08 -0.62 -0.08 -0.62 -0.08 -0.80 
Board financial experience  -0.00 -1.00 -0.00 -0.94 0.01 1.00 
Board financial education  0.02 0.67 0.02 0.67 0.01 0.25 
CEO age  -0.00 -0.99 -0.01 -0.50 -0.00 -0.30 
CEO tenure  -0.00 -0.80 -0.01 -0.40 -0.00 -0.13 
CEO elite education  0.09 1.13 0.07 0.88 0.07 0.88 
CEO outside board functions  -0.00 -0.20 -0.01 -0.50 -0.01 -0.52 
Cross-listed   -0.06 -1.00 -0.06 -1.00 -0.06 -0.67 
Firm size  -0.01 -1.00 -0.02 -1.94† -0.03 -1.88† 
Firm age  0.00 1.02 0.00 1.00 -0.00 -1.00 
Firm leverage  0.09 1.29 0.09 1.29 0.17 1.71† 
Firm diversification  0.02 1.43 0.02 1.23 0.02 1.00 
Market to book value  0.00 2.21* 0.00 2.23* 0.00 0.40 
R
2
 within countries  0.07  0.05  0.14  
Level 2 predictors        
R
2 
between countries  0.00  0.00  0.00  




Table 5. HLM Analyses. Results Firm and Country Characteristics in Normal Times 
(Continued) 
 
Please see tables 1-2 for detailed definitions of the variables. †, *, ** Denote the coefficient is significant at the 0.10, 
0.05, 0.01 level, respectively (two-tailed test). 
Dependent Variable :          Total abnormal return (adjusted industry) between July 2005 –December 2006 
 Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) 
Fixed Effect Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
Coefficie
nt 
t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
Level 1 predictors          
Corporate largest 
blockholder 
 0.05 0.83 0.06 1.01 0.06 0.86 0.06 0.86 
Family largest blockholder  0.02 0.29 0.02 0.29 0.02 0.29 0.02 0.29 
Government largest 
blockholder 
 0.02 0.22 0.02 0.22 0.02 0.22 0.02 0.22 
Institution largest 
blockholder 
 0.02 0.28 0.02 0.33 0.02 0.33 0.02 0.33 
Ownership wedge  0.01 0.20 0.01 0.20 0.01 0.18 0.01 0.20 
Board size  -0.00 -0.40 -0.00 -0.41 -0.00 -0.41 -0.00 -0.39 
Non-executive directors  0.09 0.69 0.09 0.64 0.09 0.64 0.09 0.64 
CEO duality  -0.01 -0.14 -0.01 -0.14 -0.01 -0.14 -0.01 -0.14 
CEO age  -0.00 -1.01 -0.00 -1.00 -0.00 -0.99 -0.00 -0.83 
CEO tenure  -0.00 -0.10 -0.00 -0.13 -0.00 -0.13 -0.01 -0.33 
Cross-listed   -0.05 -0.83 -0.05 -0.83 -0.05 -0.83 -0.05 -0.82 
Firm size  -0.03 -2.49* -0.02 -2.03* -0.03 -2.14* -0.03 -2.90* 
Firm age  0.00 1.00 0.00 0.91 0.00 0.87 0.00 0.81 
Firm leverage  0.11 1.57 0.11 1.57 0.11 1.57 0.11 1.57 
Firm diversification  0.02 1.43 0.02 1.43 0.02 1.38 0.02 1.43 
Market to book value  0.00 2.01* 0.00 2.05* 0.00 2.11* 0.00 2.09* 
R
2
 within countries  0.05  0.05  0.05  0.05  
          
Level 2 predictors          
Rule of law  0.07 1.40   0.07 1.80†   
Corruption index    0.05 1.25   0.04 1.33 
Shareholder protection  -0.03 -1.51 -0.03 -1.50     
Anti-director rights index      -0.02 -1.00 -0.03 -1.49 
Creditor right protection  -0.02 -1.00 -0.02 -0.99 -0.03 -1.41 -0.03 -1.49 
Market financial system  0.07 1.75† 0.07 1.83† 0.08 1.89† 0.08 1.51 
R
2 
between countries  0.18  0.15  0.19  0.13  















Legend: Dependent Variable: Crisis Return (July 2007/Dec2008). 
Fixed Effect Coefficient se  
Average Industry adjusted Crisis Return, 00  -0.00 0.02  
Random Effect Variance component df p value 
Level 2 effect,  ju0  0.02 25 0.00 
Level 1 effect,  ije  0.05   




 Table .7 HLM Analyses. Results Firm and Country Characteristics in Crisis 
 
Please see tables 1-2 for detailed definitions of the variables. †, *, ** Denote the coefficient is significant at the 0.10, 
0.05, 0.01 level, respectively (two-tailed test). 
 
Dependent Variable :                  Total abnormal return (adjusted industry) between July 2007 – 
December 2008 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
Fixed Effect Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
Level 1 predictors        
Corporate largest blockholder  0.01 0.49 0.01 0.52 0.01 0.51 
Family largest blockholder  0.02 0.67 0.02 0.65 0.02 0.62 
Government largest blockholder  0.09 2.25* 0.09 2.31* 0.09 2.26* 
Institution largest blockholder  0.04 1.89† 0.04 1.81† 0.04 1.89† 
Ownership wedge  -0.04 -2.03* -0.04 -2.09* -0.05 -2.40* 
Board size  0.01 2.71** 0.00 2.89** 0.00 0.80 
Non-executive directors  0.05 1.00   0.03 0.43 
Board independence       0.00 1.01   
Board frequency  0.00 1.82† 0.00 2.74** -0.00 -0.89 
CEO duality  0.03 1.80† 0.04 1.83† 0.02 1.74† 
Number of board committees  -0.01 -2.02*    -0.02 -1.99* -0.01 -0.49 
Auditing independence      -0.04 -1.33 
Compensation independence      0.05 0.83 
Nomination independence      0.10 1.81† 
Risk independence      -0.06 -0.87 
Strategy independence      -0.13 -0.86 
Stock option  -0.04 -2.06* -0.04 -2.03* -0.04 -1.93† 
Variable pay  -0.07 -1.82† -0.07 -1.79† -0.03 -2.03* 
Board financial experience  0.00 0.29     0.00 1.01 0.01 0.49 
Board financial education  0.00 0.89    -0.00 -0.91 -0.00 -0.21 
CEO age  0.00 0.87 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.29 
CEO tenure  0.00 0.79 0.00 0.37 0.00 0.21 
CEO elite education  -0.01 -0.33 -0.02 -0.67 -0.02 -0.62 
CEO outside board functions  -0.00 -0.89 0.00 1.01 0.00 0.81 
Cross-listed   0.03 1.49     0.04 1.80† -0.03 -0.75 
Firm size  0.01 1.00 0.01 1.79† 0.01 1.00 
Firm age  -0.00 -0.89    -0.00 -0.91 -0.00 -2.10* 
Firm leverage  -0.16 -3.21** -0.14 -3.50** -0.10 -1.11 
Firm diversification  -0.01 -2.21*    -0.01 -2.01* -0.01 -0.90 
Market to book value  0.00 0.04     0.00 0.78 -0.00 -0.05 
R
2
 within countries  0.23  0.23  0.27  
        
Level 2 predictors        
R
2 
between countries  0.00  0.00  0.00  




Table 7. HLM Analyses. Results Firm and Country Characteristics in Crisis (Continued) 
 
 
Please see tables 1-2 for detailed definitions of the variables. †, *, ** Denote the coefficient is significant at the 0.10, 
0.05, 0.01 level, respectively (two-tailed test). 
 
Dependent Variable :                    Total abnormal return (adjusted industry) between July 2007 – December 2008 
 Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) 
Fixed Effect Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
Level 1 predictors          
Corporate largest 
blockholder 
 0.02 0.90 0.02 1.01 0.02 0.99 0.02 1.05 
Family largest blockholder  0.04 1.23 0.04 1.27 0.05 1.45 0.05 1.54 
Government largest 
blockholder 
 0.08 2.02* 0.08 2.21* 0.07 2.13* 0.06 2.01* 
Institution largest 
blockholder 
 0.02 0.93 0.02 0.90 0.03 1.32 0.03 1.23 
Ownership wedge  -0.04 -1.72† -0.04 -1.99* -0.04 -2.01* -0.04 -2.06* 
Board size  0.01 2.40** 0.01 2.03* 0.01 2.81** 0.01 2.71** 
Non-executive directors  0.05 0.91 0.04 0.61 0.05 0.91 0.05 0.90 
CEO duality  0.04 1.81† 0.04 1.80† 0.04 1.81† 0.04 1.79† 
CEO age  -0.00 -0.30 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.65 0.00 0.53 
CEO tenure  0.00 0.29 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.49 0.00 0.41 
Cross-listed   0.02 1.09 0.02 0.91 0.03 1.21 0.03 1.30 
Firm size  0.01 2.00* 0.01 2.02* 0.01 1.71† 0.01 2.12* 
Firm age  -0.00 -0.40 -0.00 -0.90 -0.00 -1.01 -0.00 -0.40 
Firm leverage  -0.16 -4.30** -0.15 -3.75** -0.13 -3.25** -0.15 -3.79** 
Firm diversification  -0.01 -1.71† -0.01 -1.75† -0.01 -1.01 -0.01 -1.06 
Market to book value  0.00 0.40 0.00 0.71 0.00 0.71 0.00 0.87 
R
2
 within countries  0.20  0.20  0.20  0.20  
Level 2 predictors          
Rule of law  0.02 1.81†   0.02 1.79†   
Corruption index    0.01 1.01   0.01 1.09 
Shareholder protection  -0.01 -1.04 -0.01 -0.90     
Anti-director rights index      0.00 1.01 0.00 0.40 
Creditor right protection  0.03 2.08* 0.03 3.01** 0.03 2.01* 0.03 2.12* 
Market financial system  -0.03 -1.40 -0.03 -1.40 -0.03 -1.34 -0.03 -1.49 
R
2 
between countries  0.24  0.21  0.22  0.21  
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ENDNOTES 
                                                 
i
 The major stock indexes used in the study include Austria (ATX), Belgium (BEL 20), Cyprus 
(CY), Czech Republic (PSE), Denmark (OMX Copenhagen 20), Estonia (OMX Baltic Bench), 
Finland (OMX Helsinki 25), France (SBF 120), Germany (DAX, MDAX and SDAX), Hungary 
(BSE), Greece (FTSE/Athex 20), Ireland (ISEQ), Italy (FTSE MIB and FTSE Italia Mid Cap), 
Latvia (OMX Baltic Bench), Lithuania (OMX Baltic Bench), Luxembourg (LuxX), Netherlands 
(AEX and AMX), Norway (OBX), Poland (WSE), Portugal (PSI 20), Slovenia (LSE), Spain 
(IBEX 35), Sweden (OMX Stockholm 30), Switzerland (SMI), Turkey (ISE 100), and United 
Kingdom (FTSE 250).  
ii
 A director is considered to be independent if he or she is not a manager, nor an employee of the 
company (or its subsidiaries), nor has been in the past, nor has a family relationship with senior 
management, nor is involved in business with the company (or its subsidiaries) or a major 
shareholder (Dulewicz & Herbert, 2004; Hooghiemstra & van Manen, 2004; Kang, Cheng & 
Gray, 2007). 
iii
 See Raudenbush and Bryck (2002: 41) for more details on the calculation method. 
iv
 The results are available from the authors upon request. 
v  The results are available from the authors upon request. 
vi
 Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz & Williamson (2010) use 23 countries, Amman, Oesch & Schmid 
(2011) 22 countries, Bruno & Claessens (2010) 23 countries, Chhaochharia & Laeven (2009) 23 
countries, Durnev and Kim (2005) 24 countries, while Mitton (2002) uses 5 countries and 
Klapper & Love (2004) use 14 countries. 
 
 
